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This paper seeks to make a distinction between cognitive processes involved in conflict risk judg-
ment and those involved in conflict avoidance decisions (controllers’ interventions for separation 
assurance). First, we conducted a systematic review of the conflict detection literature to identify 
studies that focused on conflict risk assessments and studies that focused on conflict avoidance 
(intervention). We then report empirical data pertaining to controller intervention judgments. Stu-
dies on conflict avoidance have rarely described the intervention decision making process and its 
interaction with the conflict risk assessment process, whereas our data indicated differences in 
terms of information processing between judgments of conflict risk and intervention judgments. 
We provide recommendation for future studies on conflict detection and conflict avoidance. These 
findings also have implications for the development of automated conflict detection tools. 
 
 
Air traffic controllers (ATCos) assure the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of controlled aircraft between a 
departure point and a destination. Detecting and resolving potential conflicts between aircraft are the most important 
tasks that ATCos perform. To do so, ATCos have to systematically scan the display (radar screen) and check the 
trajectories of the aircraft to assess whether a minimum separation is maintained between pairs of aircraft, and if not, 
develop and implement a solution that will assure sufficient separation. Conflict detection, which is the first tasks to 
achieve to keep the air traffic safe, is a complex and dynamic task that is cognitively very demanding. This task has 
been the topic of several studies in the field (for example, Bisseret, 1981; Remington, Johnston, Ruthruff, Gold, & 
Romera, 2000; Rantanen & Nunes, 2005; Boag, Neal, Loft, & Halford, 2006; Stankovic, Raufaste, & Averty, 2008; 
Loft, Bolland, Humphreys, & Neal, 2009). Several models of conflict detection have also been proposed (among the 
most recent are Rantanen & Nunes, 2005; Stankovic et al., 2008; Loft et al., 2009). More general models of 
separation assurance which describe both conflict detection and conflict resolution processes have also been 
developed but they are less numerous than conflict detection models (see for example Niessen, Eyferth, & 
Bierwagen, 1999). We argue in this paper that there are two distinct processes that come to play after initial conflict 
detection, one that pertains to judgments of conflict risk and another regarding conflict avoidance (intervention) 
decisions, and that great care should be taken not to confound them in experimental tasks or in models of conflict 
detection and avoidance. 
 
Conflict Detection 
 
The focus of current theoretical models of conflict detection concerns how controllers determine whether 
specific aircraft pairs that have been selectively attended will be in conflict or not. We define conflict as the potential 
loss of separation between two aircraft, or a situation where two aircraft would lose separation at some time in the 
future should they continue on their present trajectories. Consider two aircraft flying at the same altitude on 
converging courses. Determining whether these aircraft will violate lateral separation requires the integration of 
speed and distance information to predict the distance or time between the aircraft at the point of intersection of their 
trajectories (Law et al., 1993; Loft, Neal, & Humphreys, 2007; Neal & Kwantes, 2009). When aircraft are also 
changing altitude (especially in approach control), the prediction of loss of separation in the future also requires the 
integration of the vertical speeds and altitudes of aircraft, and the subsequent computation of whether the difference 
between aircraft altitudes at the time of the position overlap on the lateral plane are below a minimum separation 
(Stankovic, Loft, Rantanen, & Ponomarenko, in press; Xu & Rantanen, 2003). Several theoretical accounts of how 
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controllers detect conflicts have been published (Loft, Bolland, Humphreys & Neal, 2009; Rantanen & Nunes, 2005; 
Stankovic, Raufaste, & Averty, 2008).  
In empirical studies of conflict detection, researchers have typically either asked controllers to assess the 
risk of conflict between aircraft or to estimate the likelihood that they would intervene on a given aircraft pair to 
assure separation, but there has been little consideration of whether these two types of judgment are tapping into the 
similar decision process or not.Bisseret (1981) made a distinction between those two cognitive processes thirty years 
ago. In his study on decision making made by ATCos, he reported several studies that investigated conflict detection 
made by expert ATCos and trainees. In this study, Bisseret distinguished the information processing (risk of loss of 
separation) from the decision (intervention) process. Bisseret showed that trainees made more accurate separation 
estimations than expert controllers. This particular result has been explained by the safety margins that experienced 
controllers apply. Bisseret further hypothesized that experienced controllers are more concerned about succeeding in 
their overall control task (which also includes orderly and expeditious flow of traffic) than in the accuracy of their 
conflict risk assessments. On the basis of this hypothesis, Bisseret suggested that experienced controllers’ operating 
decision process should not be entirely based upon their diagnosis of the air traffic situation. In an earlier study 
Bouju (1978) had asked experienced controllers to make a diagnosis (conflict or not) for twelve (six conflict and six 
non-conflit) air traffic situations, and to express their intention for intervention (action or not) for the same situations. 
Results showed that controllers decided to take actions in nine situations diagnosed as non-conflict, lending support 
to Bisseret‘s hypothesis that conflict risk judgments and decisions to intervene are separable.  
Stankovic, Neal and Hasenbosch (2010) proposed in a recent study a model of separation assurance that 
described five, instead of three, main cognitive processes: (1) information gathering (selection of information), (2) 
trajectory anticipation (risk judgments of loss of separation), (3) intervention (decision making about future 
intervention), (4) solution choice (selection of conflict solution strategy), and (5) planning (resolution course of 
actions). These separation assurance processes are influenced by changes in ATCos’ environment and their strategies. 
This study showed the importance of consider all separation assurance processes and their interactions when 
studying conflict detection, and in doing so makes a distinction between the conflict risk process (which corresponds 
to trajectories anticipation in their model) and the intervention process. Conflict risk consists of a judgment ATCos 
make about the loss of separation between aircraft, whereas intervention requires ATCos to decide whether to 
intervene or not on a particular pair of aircraft. Recent studies have reported quite different results using the two 
questioning methods (risk versus intervention).  
 
Judgment of Conflict Risk 
 
Several experimental studies have asked the participants to judge the risk of conflict between two or more 
aircraft. Bisseret (1981) did so when he investigated controllers’ diagnosis process. More recently, Stankovic et al. 
(2008) used this method and three specific variables to predict controller judgment of conflict risk, (1) the distance 
between the crossing point of the aircraft pair trajectories and the closest aircraft to that point, (2) the distance 
between the two aircraft when they are laterally closest, and (3) the lateral distance between the two aircraft when 
their growing vertical distance reached 1,000 feet. These variables accounted for up to 50% of the variance in 
conflict judgments made by expert controllers. Stankovic et al. asked expert ATCos to judge the risk of conflict 
between two aircraft using an 8-pt scale (from “assured airprox” to “no conflict”). Large individual differences in 
controllers’ judgments were evident. One group of controllers seemed to be more influenced by a distance that takes 
into account vertical separation between aircraft (the lateral distance between the two aircraft when their growing 
vertical distance reaches 1,000 feet) when judging the risk of conflict between aircraft than the other group of 
controllers.  
In a recent study, Stankovic, Loft, Rantanen and Ponomarenko (in press) also reported individual 
differences in the effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgments. In this study, we asked fourteen expert 
controllers to judge the risk of conflict between aircraft for situation were four variables (environmental cues) were 
manipulated, (1) lateral conflict geometry, (2) vertical separation between aircraft, (3), time to lateral separation 
threshold (3 nm), and (4) groundspeed difference between the aircraft. The question used to collect conflict risk 
judgment was the same used in the Stankovic, et al. (2008) study, but the scale was different (a 12-pt scale, from “no 
risk of conflict” to “extreme risk of conflict”). Results showed that an important effect of vertical separation between 
aircraft on controllers’ judgments of conflict risk. Overall, the conflict risk judgments increased as the vertical 
separation decreased. Most importantly, we found individual differences in the effect of the vertical separation on 
conflict risk judgments. One group of controllers (group 1, N = 7) made lower conflict risk ratings than the other 
group of controllers (group 2, N = 7), and the effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgment was greater for 
controllers in group 1 than for the controllers of group 2. Controllers in group1were more experienced (i.e., total 
experience, sector specific experience, older) than controllers in group 2, indicating that experienced controllers were 
less conservative and took vertical separation more into consideration than their less experienced counterparts. 
 
Decisions of Intervention 
 
Another experimental task consists in asking participant about their intention to intervene in a situation to 
assure separation between aircraft. This was one of the methods used by Bouju (1978). More recently, Loft et al. 
(2009) used this method for their study on conflict detection. Like Bisseret (1981), Loft et al. proposed that 
controllers use ‘safety margins’ to assure separation between aircraft. These safety margins reflect expectations 
regarding likely variation in aircraft trajectory, and also the degree to which controllers are biased to favor safety 
over accuracy. Depending on the magnitude of safety margins, controller predictions of aircraft position at specific 
points in the future will be some distance closer or further (or higher or lower in the vertical plane) than the positions 
predicted by aircraft state values. To test their the theory, Loft et al. (2009) presented to their participants pairs of 
aircraft and asked them to provide intervention judgments on a four point scale. A two-parameter computational 
model that emulated how controllers approximate aircraft trajectory closely predicted the conflict risk judgments 
made by controllers. A key finding reported by Loft et al. (2009) was that there was no variability in risk judgment as 
a function of the vertical separation between aircraft. Instead, risk judgment only varied with changes in aircraft 
lateral separation. To account for these data, the Loft et al. (2009) model was simplified to assume that controllers 
always consider aircraft pairs to be in vertical conflict when aircraft are descending or climbing through the levels of 
other aircraft. Loft et al. argued that controllers prefer to intervene to assure aircraft separation when aircraft are 
climbing through the levels of other aircraft in order to manage their own workload (Loft, Sanderson, Neal & Mooij, 
2007), and thus that their computational model should indeed be able to predict risk judgments without the setting of 
a vertical separation safety margin parameter. This result contradicts the effect of vertical separation on conflict 
detection reported by Stankovic et al. (in press). 
Once ATCos have detected a conflict risk between two aircraft, then they will intervene by instructing one 
of the aircraft to maneuver to avoid the conflict (Stankovic, Neal & Hasenbosch, 2010). This risk-intervention 
process has been rarely investigated as a unified process except by Bisseret (1981). Researchers have used risk 
judgment to examine conflict detection or conflict resolution, but to our knowledge only Bisseret’s study examined 
cognitive processes involved in intervention decision. Despite the close relationship between judgment about the risk 
of conflict and intervention decision, it is worthwhile to specify the cognitive processes involved in each operation. 
This question is particularly urgent as new conflict detection tools that automate the conflict detection process are to 
be implemented in the air traffic management (ATM) systems worldwide (for a review see:Neal, Flach, Mooij, 
Lehman, Stankovic et al., 2011). Moreover, as showed by Bisseret (1981) intervention actions may occur even if a 
situation is diagnosed as non-conflict (cf. Loft et al., 2009). 
Some studies on conflict resolution, however, have focused on the type of intervention actions that are 
applied by ATCos, once they have decided to intervene on a particular aircraft. For instance, Leroux (1999) defined 
three different policies that controllers apply when resolving conflicts according to task load level: (1) “be elegant 
first”, (2) “be efficient first”, and (3) “be safe and nothing more”. A good description of how ATCos adapt their 
control strategies to anticipated workload and task demands is also provided in Loft et al. (2007). 
Recent studies have reported quite different results using the different experimental tasks (judging the risk 
of conflict or the likelihood of intervention). For example, Loft, et al. (2009) claimed that there was no variability in 
risk judgment as a function of the vertical separation between aircraft, whereas Stankovic et al. (in press) reported an 
effect of vertical separation on conflict risk judgments made by expert controllers. The latter showed that controllers’ 
judgments of conflict risk increased as vertical separation decreased for the half of the participants. In the same study 
and in addition to the risk of conflict judgments, Stankovic et al. asked fourteen licensed air traffic controllers (12 
men and 2 women) to judge the likelihood by which they will intervene to assure separation between aircraft. Three 
questions were asked about three other judgments relating to strategies used to ensure separation, (1) will you 
intervene by assigning a new level to the descending aircraft? (2) will you intervene by assigning a new route to the 
descending aircraft, or (3) will you intervene by assigning both a new level and a new route to the descending 
aircraft. These data on intervention judgments have not been reported before. 
First, we compared the three types of intervention (level, heading or both level and heading) to each other 
and we found a preference for the level solution compared to the heading solution (t(1,13) = 3.11, p = .002) and to 
the both level and heading solution (t(1,13) = 3.23, p = .001). This result is not surprising since in approach control 
controllers sequence aircraft for landing and takeoff by using mainly level solution. For this reason we decided to put 
together all intervention judgments (level, heading and both level and heading) by keeping the higher scores among 
all intervention judgments. We obtained thus just one intervention judgment variable. We used the Tukey for Post hoc 
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tests and the values for small, medium and large effect sizes of.10, .25 and .40 respectively (Cohen, 1988). One 
important result was the significant difference between judgments of conflict risk and intervention judgments, t(1,13) 
= 2.85, p = .004. Post hoc tests showed that controllers made higher intervention judgments (M = 9.27, SD = .68) 
than conflict of risk judgments (M = 7.30, SD = .53). This result confirmed Bisseret (1981) hypothesis, expert 
controllers intervene on pair of aircraft that have been diagnosed not to be in conflict. We also found an effect of 
vertical separation on intervention judgments for the Same heading scenarios, F(2, 26) = 5.41, p =.011, ηp² = 0.29; 
for Opposite heading scenarios, F(2, 26) = 5.54, p =.010, ηp² = 0.30; and for the Cross Heading scenarios,  F(2, 26) = 
2.94, p =.071, ηp² = 0.18. These patterns are similar to those found for risk of conflict judgments; however this effect 
of vertical separation on intervention judgments was less than the effect found for conflict risk judgments. Only four 
controllers were sensitive to vertical separation in making intervention assessments. This result showed that the 
effect of vertical separation is less important on intervention judgments than on conflict risk judgments. This is 
consistent with Loft et al. (2009) findings and may attest to the difficulty of vertical speed calculations or estimations 
in conflict situations. 
 
Discussion 
 
There are empirical results that support the need for distinguishing between judgments of conflict risk and 
intervention decisions. First, we reported at least two recent studies on conflict detection that presented results in 
contradiction but that also confirm our hypothesis about of two sub-processes in ATC conflict detection and 
avoidance. Loft et al. (2009) showed that conflict detection (intervention decisions) was not affected by variation in 
vertical separation between aircraft. Hence, Loft et al. concluded that the controllers’ made no calculations about 
vertical distance between aircraft but rather applied safety margins for detecting conflicts. On the other hand, 
Stankovic et al. (in press) showed that experienced controllers made calculations of vertical separation for judging 
the risk of conflict between aircraft. These two different results are, however, in line with Bisseret’s (1981) 
conclusions. Conflict detection implies a conflict risk process which consists of assessment of the future separation 
between aircraft mainly based on calculations, or at least more than the intervention decision process which is mainly 
based on the conflict risk assessment. 
Moreover, the comparison of results reported on conflict risk judgments reported in Stankovic et al. (in 
press) with the results on intervention decisions reported above also confirm the existence of two conflict detection 
sub-processes. Hence, results on conflict risk judgments showed that controllers took into account vertical separation 
between aircraft to judge the risk of conflict between aircraft. Results on intervention judgments showed also an 
effect of vertical separation on controller’s intervention ratings; however this effect was reported for only 4 
controllers. Controllers also made higher intervention judgments than conflict risk judgments for the same situation. 
Latter result shows that controllers made their intervention decision based on conflict risk assessment, but it also 
shows that controllers are more cautious when deciding to intervene than when assessing the risk of conflict between 
aircraft. 
In conclusion, the empirical results reported above confirm Bisseret’s conclusions that controllers are more 
interested in overall control task than in accuracy of individual conflict risk judgments, and that experienced 
controllers' operative decision process are not be entirely based upon his diagnosis (conflict risk judgment) of the 
situation but it is also include the application of safety margins such as Loft et al. (2009) showed. Conflict detection 
process implies two sub-processes: (1) a conflict risk judgment process and, (2) an intervention decision process.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This research highlighted the differences between cognitive processes involved in intervention and those 
involved in conflict detection. Controllers make more calculations in estimating the risk of conflict between aircraft 
than for deciding to intervene in a given situation. As for conflict detection, it seems that intervention operation is 
affected by vertical separation between aircraft, thus conflict detection tools which displays pair of aircraft in conflict 
and which suggest intervention solution should integrate such differences. This particular result on differences 
between conflict detection and intervention processes should be considered for the account of the reason why ATCos 
very often do not trust conflict detection tools when completing conflict resolution task.  
It may also be argued that conflict avoidance, that is, decisions to intervene in potential conflicts early on, 
without careful assessment of the actual conflict risk is part of strategic ATC and an effective means to manage 
workload and maintain an accurate picture of the traffic situation. Accurate conflict risk assessment requires 
considerable amounts of cognitive (especially attentional) resources that ATCos working busy traffic can ill afford to 
trade off against strategic advantages. That experienced controllers exhibit such traits supports this hypothesis. 
The aim of this paper was to clarify the conflict detection process rather than claiming that one method 
(conflict risk versus intervention question) is better than another. On the contrary, what it is claimed here is that both 
conflict risk judgments and intervention decisions should be considered when studying the conflict detection 
processes. For the design of future experimental protocols, distinguishing conflict risk judgments and intervention 
decisions is crucial since this clarification should guide researchers for choosing an appropriate method (question 
about the risk of conflict or about intervention) for the particular research questions they investigate. Understanding 
how expert controllers make conflict detection decisions in air traffic control is also crucial for the design and the 
evaluation of the future Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems (Stankovic, Neal & Hasenbosch, 2010). In 
particular, when conflict detection tools envisaged in the future ATM systems allocate conflict risk assessments to an 
automated system and as a consequence separate conflict risk judgments from intervention decision.  
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